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1. Introduction 
It has long been established that pay formulas containing an element 
of profit-sharing have non-inflationary employment promotion properties 
(Vanek, 1965), except in self-managed enterprises (e.g. Vanek, 1970). 
In recent literature economy-wide profit-sharing combined with workers' 
strict exclusion from employment decisions is being promoted as a scheme 
guaranteeing the achievement of a blissful state of non-inflationary 
excess demand for labour, absorbing all or part of possible deflationary 
shocks (Weitzman, 1983, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1986). Weitzman 's proposal i"s 
reminiscent of the set-up in Catch-22, ··where a wheeler-dealer retrades and 
speculates with army supplies originally meant for the soldiers, who are 
supposed instead to benefit from their share in the profit of his operations; 
everybody has a share, nobody has a say, and the main beneficiary of the 
scheme is its proposer. The purpose of this paper is that of separating 
the beneficial effects of profit-sharing which are neither new nor 
controversial from the new propositions put forward by Weitzman which I 
shall argue to be overclaims. 
2. Employment promotion through profit-sharing 
The employment promotion effects of profit-sharing were first noted 
by Jaroslav Vanek (1965), who compares the macroeconomic effects of 
replacing a given wage rate with a lower rate plus a compensatory profit-
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sharing agreement such as to leave unchanged each labourer's money income 
for a given number of hours worked. The new arrangement has the same 
effects of a lower money wage except for the additional employment effect 
on aggregate demand due to the postulated higher propensity to consume out 
of profits distributed to workers than out of residual profits. Abstracting 
from this, which is a benefit in keynesian underemployment equilibrium, the 
effects of a lower wage with or without compensatory profit-sharing are the 
same and depend on the behaviour of prices. 
If prices fell in the same proportion as money wages the real wage 
would remain unchanged and therefore the marginal physical product of 
labour and the employment level would be unaffected; any profit shared by 
workers would come from what previously accrued to entrepreneurs. If 
prices remained unchanged the real wage would fall in the same proportion 
as money wages and employment would expand until the marginal physical 
product of labour falls to match the full reduction of real wage; only 
the profit shared by the newly employed makes a dent in the profits 
previously accruing to entrepreneurs. Neither extreme position of 
constant or fully flexible prices, however, is a possible equilibrium for 
an unchanged quantity of money. If prices remained unchanged a higher 
real output would require a higher quantity of money without which there 
would be no effective demand for the additional output and therefore 
prices would be under pressure to fall. If prices fell proportionally 
as much as wages an unchanged real income would require a fall in the 
quantity of money, without which effective demand would be driving up 
prices and eroding some of the price fall. An unchanged quantity of money, 
which Vanek calls "neutral" monetary policy, would achieve real and 
monetary equilibrium at a price level lower than before though higher 
than if proportional to wages, and at an employmer-t level higher than 
before though not as high as that corresponding to constant prices. 
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Vanek's model, which he presents diagrammatically, could be summarised 
as follows: 
(1) Y = F(N), 
where ! = real output, ~ is labour employed initially lower than the full 
employment level ~f; F'>O for ~<~f and E:_"<O; 
(2) F' = F'(N); 
(3) w/p = F' 
where ~ is the money wage rate in the wage economy or the fixed component 
of pay in the profit~sharing economy, the equality between the marginal 
physical product of labour and the marginal real cost of labour to firms 
being the profit maximisation condition in both economies, implicitly 
assumed as perfectly competitive (o.therw1· se the marginal revenue product 
of labour would become relevant for profit-maximisation by firms); 
(4) Q(i, M, p, Y) = 0 
where~ is the money rate of interest and~ the quantity of money, the 
equation expressing the simultaneous achievement of the Hicksian IS-LM 
equilibrium in the monetary and real sectors of the economy, i.e. a 
constellation of variables such t 1· h as o equa 1se t e demand for money 
with its quantity ~ and the combined supply of savings and imports with 
the combined investment and exports de~and. For given w and M this 
simple system determines the equilibrium levels of ~. ~~! an~!· 
Vanek infers from the model that the replacement of a given wage 
rate by a lower rate plus a fully compensatory profit-sharing arrangement 
will have the following effects under a neutral monetary policy: i) a 
higher level of labour employment in the economy; ii) a higher real 
income; iii) lower prices; iv) an expansion in the volume of exports, 
because of greater international compet1.t1·veness d ma e possible by lower 
prices; v) lower import propensity due to import substitution at lower 
domestic prices; vi) higher or lower volume of imports according to 
whether or not the .import substitution effect is larger than the import 
requirements of additional output; vii) probably th~ugh not necessarily 
an improvement in the ba~ance of payments, i.e. as .long as the combined 
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effect of import substitution and export promotion through lower prices 
is sufficient to offset the import requirements of additional output; 
viii) a reduction of corporate profits after taxes ·and after labour-share 
disbursements, because the newly employed add to profit less than what 
they receive as profit share; ix) will have an indeterminate effect on 
the state budget; a loss is due to the tax rate applicable to workers' 
incomes being lower than that earlier applied to profits, but a smaller 
or higher amount of additional tax revenue (and unemployment benefits 
saved) will accrue to the government because of the higher level of 
activity; x) the share of labour in national income will necessarily 
increase, because of the positive change in income and the negative 
change in the amount of profits going to entrepreneurs. 
Alternatively, the government could decide to prevent prices from 
falling as a result of the new arrangement and follow a policy of price 
stability which, in the circumstances, corresponds to monetary expansion 
to raise aggregate demand and enable firms to sell the additional output 
they wish to produce at a lower real wage without lowering prices. In 
that case for given~ and~ Vanek's model determines !• ~· !• !; its 
predictions differ from the earlier case in the following respects: (i) 
stronger employment effects from profit-sharing; (ii) stronger real 
income effects; (iii) no longer holds by assumption; (iv) exports remain 
unchanged; (v) import substitution does not occur; (vi) imports increase; 
(vii) the balance of payments deteriorates; (viii) corporate profits do 
not change; (iv) and (x) continue to hold. 
In addition to these effects Vanek expects that the higher income and 
therefore fuller utilisation of existing capital equipment, in the absence 
of a systematic effect on the interest rate in either direction, would 
promote capital formation and technical change thus raising the economy's 
growth rate. 
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3. Profit-sharing as employment subsidy 
In spite of the considerable advantages listed ·by Vanek, from his 
analysis profit-sharing is not a pay formula incontrovertibly superior to 
the fixed wage. Within Vanek's framework profit-sharing will not be 
introduced by firms unless total pay per worker is·lower than the 
alternative fixed wage, to compensate for the lower profits and profit 
share predicted by Vanek. A lower pay per worker, however, would sacrifice 
employed workers in favour of those unemployed who would benefit from the 
employment generated by profit-sharing, but the same kind of trade-off 
between individual real pay and total employment is available under a 
fixed wage system. It is true that with profit-sharing a given cut in 
real pay per man generates more employment, because the marginal cost of 
labour is by definition lower to employers, but the additional employment 
effect is paid for by employers getting lower profits than if the same pay 
was made up of a fixed wage (as Vanek shows in his paper, point (viii) 
above). If employers could be persuaded or forced (through taxation) to 
subsidise employment to the same extent the effect would be exactly the 
same. It is the implicit subsidy on employment, and not the pay formula 
as such, which generates beneficial effects. Starting from a situation where 
the government has already subsidised all it considers worthy of sut-s1cty 
and has already taxed the public to match to the desired degree these 
subsidies and its other expenditure, there is no room for improvement 
through pay reform other than sheer benefaction on the part of employers 
or of those already employed. Alternatively, if an expansionary monetary 
policy accompanies the introduction of profit-sharing, the necessary 
deterioration in the balance of payments will deter the government from 
promoting profit-sharing or undertaking the equivalent policy of employment 
subsidisation financed out of profit tax. Thus Vanek provides not only an 
analysis of the effects of the possible introduction of pofit-sharing but, 
indirectly, an indication of a good reason likely to prevent its i~t~oduction 
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Vanek's analysis is inadequate in two major respects. He claims that 
his conclusions hold even if only a part of the economy changes to profit-
sharing, the degree of the different effects varying with the relative size 
of the profit-sharing sector, but his analysis contains no elements for 
explaining the actual scale on which profit-sharing might be introduced 
spontaneously in the economy. He also claims that· the output of the profit-
sharing sector will expand a good deal while the non-profit-sharing sector 
will contract; but the very coexistence of profit-sharing and fixed 
wage formulas is hard to explain without the introduction of additional 
elements of analysis. Within Vanek's framework either pay or profitability 
can be the same in the two sectors, not both; but then what makes entre-
preneurs or workers in some sectors and not in others accept lower 
rewards than available elsewhere? Profit-sharing cannot be discussed 
without reference to its impact on the uncertainty faced by workers and 
firms. 
4. Profit-sharing and uncertainty 
Alternative pay formulas imply different probability distributions 
and, therefore, expected values and measures of dispersion (such as standard 
deviation) for the profitability of firms and for both unemployment risk 
and pay of workers, thus defining trade-offs for the consideration of both 
firms and workers. 
Let us compare a fixed pay y with a profit-sharing scheme offering a 
fixed element a and profits ~ with a given probability distribution whose 
expected value is ~(~)=y-~ and standard deviation ~(~)>Q. By definition 
~(l)=Q, thus workers will prefer y to ~+~(~) if they are risk-averse - as 
they are usually assumed to be. The probability~ of unemployment, however, 
is different under the two arrangements, namely its expected value under 
fixed pay uy is greater than under profit-sharing ~; the dispersion of 
unemployment risk is not affected because neither the fixed wage nor the 
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fixed component of mixed pay are flexible during the cycle. The lower is 
~ the lower is the expected unemployment but the higher is the dispersion 
of workers' earnings~+~(~). Whether or not any of the infinite combinations 
of parameters ~ and !(~) adding up to y is preferred to y by workers will 
depend on their preferred trade-off between job security and income security. 
(Alternatively we could incorporate unemployment into an income probability 
distribution as the probability of zero income, and treat the choice by 
workers as one between expected value and dispersion of earnings under the 
two regimes; this would be tidier but would oversimplify the alternatives 
given the discontinuity in employment/unemployment status). The most 
attractive profit-sharing formula might be more, or less, or equally 
attractive than a fixed wage equal to their combined expected value. 
For firms a profit-sharing arrangement involves cyclical flexibility 
of labour costs and therefore greater stability of profit levels and rates, 
i.e. s(ry)>s(rh). Entrepreneurs are usually thought to be risk lovers or at 
most risk neutral, but their "failure aversion" and concern to stay well 
within a "solvency threshold" (Malinvaud 1986) is bound to set limits to . 
their risk-love or neutrality; they may or may not be induced to regard 
greater stability of profit rates as an advantage. The attraction of a 
profit-sharing scheme will depend on their attitude to risk, the actual 
probability distributions of !y and Eh and the cost of alternative ways 
of reducing risk (through diversification of assets etc.) which may be 
available to them. 
For part of a fixed pay to be replaced by a profit share the terms 
have to be mutually advantageo~s to both workers and firms. It may be 
that workers are so job security conscious and gain so much additional 
security by accepting greater earnings dispersion that they are prepared 
to accept a lower average pay than the going fixed rate associated with 
high unemployment risk. Or it may be that entrepreneurs are so close to 
their "solvency threshold" that in order to stabilise profits they are 
willing to pay out profits whose expected value is higher than what would 
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make up the difference between the fixed component of pay and the going 
fixed rate. More often than not risk-averse workers and risk-loving 
entrepreneurs will go for a fixed rate, as we know from observation. 
There are two other reasons, however, why profit-sharing arrangements 
are not widespread. First, when part of a fixed pay is replaced by a 
profit share regarded as equivalent by workers the employment effect of 
this change and the consequent necessary dilution of the profit share will 
have to be considered by workers already employed. Workers will need 
information about demand and technology to find what fraction of profits 
can be regarded as equivalent to a given part of fixed pay which is being 
replaced; or they will need assurances that there will be no dilution 
i.e. no employment effect, or even better a certain amount of control over 
decisions directly or indirectly affecting employment, in which case however 
the employment creation effect will be at least partly lost. This is one of 
the reasons why profit-sharing arrangements are often associated with forms 
of workers' participation in decision-making. 
Second, after the introduction of a profit-sharing pay formula a firm 
employing workers up to the point where labour's marginal product equates 
the fixed element of pay will soon realise that it could raise profits by 
switching back to a fixed wage and reducing employment, unless one of the 
following conditions obtains: i) the firm is close to its solvency threshold 
and is so anxious to stabilise profits as to accept the loss involved in 
employing some workers at an average. cost higher. than their marginal product; 
ii) existing workers are tenured in law or in practice and a profit share is 
paid to them in lieu of an increase in fixed pay; iii) the introduction of 
profit-sharing lowers average pay with respect to the alternative fixed wage 
or iv) raises labour productivity so that either lower average pay or a 
productivity increase compensates for the hiring of workers at an average 
cost higher than their marginal product. Condition (iii) is unlikely, in 
view of workers' risk-aversion; the other conditions explain why profit-
sharing is often introduced in firms close to a financial crisis (where 
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the risk of unemployment for workers is also greater) or in firms where 
productivity effects are expected from profit-sharing. 
5. Profit-sharing and productivity 
In his pioneering 1965 article Vanek asserted that" ••• there is a 
strong presumption that profit participation in itself would improve the 
quality and efficiency of labor, and make workers more concerned about the 
success of their enterprise" (p. 212) but did not discuss these points. 
Subsequent literature has developed further Vanek's suggestions. 
An improvement of "the quality and efficiency of labor" could not 
come from individual extra effort (as it does under a piece-rate system) 
since each of ~ workers employed will only get at most a fraction 1/~ of 
the product of his own extra-effort (Samuelson, 1977) and on the contrary 
may reduce effort if he can get away with it, being exposed at most only 
to 1/~ of the output loss deriving from his own lower effort. A productivity 
increase, however, can be expected from workers, costlessly to themselves, 
gaining from intelligent and effective:·use of any given individual level 
of effort, from cooperating with other workers and management and from 
monitoring and supervising each other's effort, efficiency and cooperation 
(Reich and Devine, 1981; Fitzroy and Kraft, 1985). 
Workers' "concern about the success of their enterprise" - deriving 
directly from profit-sharing - is bound to reduce the number and intensity 
of conflicts in the workplace in general, making workers identify partly 
with the enterprise and lengthening their time horizon; this effect will 
be stronger if accompanied by measures of workers' participation in 
decision-making, as in German-style Mitbestimmung (Aoki, 1984; Cable, 1984; 
Fitzroy and Mueller, 1984; on Mitbestimmung see Nutzinger, 1983). When 
workers receive detailed and credible information and participate in 
decision-making they are more likely to accept unpopular decisions; 
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although conflicts made more tractable by the introduction of codeter-
mination afterwards are bound to reappear over time (Furobotn, 1985). 
Productivity improvements - without which, we have argued in the 
previous section, it is difficult to conceive the viability of profit-
sharing other than as a crisis management instrument - are confirmed to 
be important both historically and in empirical studies. Mitchell 
(1985) refers to both of the points raised by Vanek. Workers' partici-
pation in enterprise revenue or profit has been introduced in modern 
capitalism, historically, as "a way of putting the employee on the side 
of management, thereby boosting production and efficiency" as well as 
"as a way of building employee loyalty, thus avoiding industrial unrest 
and unions" (Mitchell, 1985, p. 38). No wonder, therefore, that profit-
sharing is not usually popular with Trades Unions. Recent empirical 
studies suggest modest but sizeable improvements in enterprise economic 
performance from eo-determination and profit-sharing (Cable and Fitzroy, 
1980; Estrin et al., 1984) when and where they occur, though there may 
have been costs that remained unobserved and the improvements cannot be 
generalised. 
6. eo-determination and employment 
eo-determination can be expected to accompany profit-sharing: "As 
best existing practice shows, companies which share profits also share 
information and indeed some areas of decision-making" (Financial Times 
editorial, "Sharing more than profits", 13 May 1986). "Decision-sharing 
is not an optional extra. The measurement of profits - especially in 
large groups where the profit-sharing group is likely to be a division 
- is likely to be contentious unless very full information is available 
••• Where information is shared, decisions are bound to be discussed" 
(ibidem). Even without profit-sharing workers are subjected to the 
consequences of enterprise decisions affecting their risk of unemployment 
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(a risk which, unlike capitalists, they cannot reduce through diversifi-
cation) and therefore have a moral/political claim to participation in 
decision-making; when their income is also directly·affected their claim 
becomes stronger. 
While eo-determination strengthens the productivity gains deriving 
from profit-sharing (see previous section) it reduces its employment 
generation potential because of employment protection policies conceivably 
encouraged or adopted by those already employed in their exercise of 
eo-determination. This is why the enterprise type which is characterised 
by 100 per cent profit-sharing and 100 per cent self-management - i.e. 
the cooperative enterprise - is expected to adopt employment-restrictive 
policies and respond "perversely" or at any rate inelastically to output 
price changes or capital charges, and to shy away from self-financed 
investment, in the pursuit of maximum income per member. Ironically the 
theory of labour- managed enterprises where profit-sharing is accompanied 
by employment- restrictive policies has been developed and promoted by 
the same person who first pointed out the employment-promotion properties 
of profit-sharing in isolation ( Vanek, 1970, who developed the approach· 
initiated by Ward, 1958). In empirical studies of cooperative firms 
there is no evidence of restrictive employment policies and perverse 
response, or even under-investment from self-finance (Uvalic, 1986); 
probably these tendencies are partly offset by other economic (job 
security, growth-mindedness, etcetera) and non- economic stimuli (Nuti, 
1986c, Horvat, 1986). But there must be a presumption that- other 
things being equal - an employment restriction tendency might be associated 
with eo-determination. We can also presume that workers' eagerness to 
press and ability to assert demands for eo-determination, as in the case 
of other demands of theirs, increase as unemployment diminishes. Hence 
the employment-generating benefits of profit-sharing can be at least 
partly offset by the restrictive employment tendencies possibly associated 
with eo-determination brought about by profit-sharing and by greater 
proximity to full employment. 
- 12 -
7. Non-inflationary over-full employment? 
The analysis conducted so far suggests that profit-sharing is a pay 
formula which, for unchanged productivity and average pay, reduces profit 
dispersion for firms and raises for workers their chance of continued 
employment at the expense of higher dispersion of earnings. The trade-off 
may be attractive to some extent to both parties if workers are sufficiently 
worried by unemployment and firms by insolvency. The replacement of a fixed 
market wage with a profit-sharing formula having the same average pay will 
induce firms to expand employment but if the expansion takes place workers 
will find that their pay has fallen; thus a higher profit share has to be 
chosen so as to leave unchanged pay per man after employment expansion. The 
firm however in the circumstances would reduce its profits as a result of 
profit-sharing, because the given pay is higher than the marginal product of 
the additional worker. Thus the firm will grant a profit share in lieu of 
a wage increase only if existing workers have tenure, or if the profit loss 
is fully compensated by greater profit stability, or if the profit-sharing 
formula has a sufficiently lower average value to prevent a profit fall 
with respect to a fixed wage (which is unlikely) or if labour productivity 
increases sufficiently as a result of profit-sharing (which is more likely). 
Labour productivity may be raised in some enterprises by profit-sharing 
through collective monitoring of efficiency and effort and through the 
reduction of conflicts. Go-determination is likely to accompany profit-
sharing reinforcing its productivity-enhancing effects and weakening its 
employment-promotion effects. It is for firms and workers to consider the 
costs and benefits deriving to them from a profit-sharing formula, just as 
for other parameters of the labour co~tract (tenure, eo-determination, 
frequency of payment, indexation, etcetera). There is no reason why 
profit-sharing should be forced upon unwilling workers and firms by well-
meaning reformers, beyond the extent they are prepared to consider in 
their market transactions (See also Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Nuti, 1986b). 
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This state of the art was challenged and, apparently, thoroughly 
revolutionised by Martin Weitzman (1983, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1986). 
Weitzman maintained that generalised profit-sharing would guarantee not 
just a non-inflationary increase in employment but the achievement of 
full employment, a non-inflationary permanent excess demand for labour 
and therefore the maintenance of full employment in the face of deflatio-
nary shocks; these benefits are not realised automatically only because 
the pay formula is a public good - hence the necessity of an educational 
campaign and tax incentives. Weitzman has taken a crusading stance and 
his enthusiasm has infected others (e.g. Solow, to Meade and to J.E. 
Roemer, from comments printed on the cover of Weitzman, 1984), received 
wide press coverage (Financial Times, Time Magazine, Wall Street Journal, 
New York Times, Economist, etcetera) and attention in political 
circles (e.g. socialdemocratic in Britain, republican in Italy). 
Weitzman has the great merit of stressing the high private and 
social cost of unemployment, which others belittle as the result of 
investment in search activities or wage reservation if not a fashion for 
leisure; and of drawing attention to an important area of research which 
had been almost totally submerged by the overgrown literature on cooperatives 
with which it partly overlaps. Unfort~nately, his miracle cure for 
stagflation cannot possibly work. 
Let us consider one by one the changes introduced by Weitzman in the 
assumptions made and the arguments ~e~eloped in the previous sections. 
Namely, these are: i) imperfect com~etition; ii) marginal revenue product 
at full employment being both positive and higher than the minimum fixed 
element of pay acceptable to wqrke~s; iii) persistence of profit-sharing 
at full employment even in long~term equilibrium; iv) perception by firms 
of the fixed element of pay as the marginal cost of labour in spite of 
excess demand at the going average rate of pay; v) no workers' involvement 
whatever in enterprise decisions affecting employment. 
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i) Imperfect competition is a welcome extension of Vanek's original 
framework: it implies that firms equalise the marginal cost of labour not 
to the physical marginal product of labour valued at current prices but 
to the marginal revenue product of labour. It follows that the replacement 
of a fixed wage with an equivalent formula containing an element of profit-
sharing will reduce both pay (because of dilution after employment expansion) 
and profits {because of new workers adding to profit less than their profit 
share) in money terms, but not or not as much in real terms if the profit-
sharing arrangement is introduced on an economy-wide scale and all firms 
lower their price to sell the additional output. Hence an element of 
externality and public good appears in the pay formula. However, under 
the same assumptions, exactly the same argument could be applied in the 
short run to a generalised money wage reduction, matched by a profit tax 
used to finance tax relief on workers' incomes, while in the long run a 
wage reduction would achieve full employment on the same conditions and 
for the same real level of earnings as a profit-sharing formula. Thus a 
low wage is as much of an externality or a public good as a profit-sharing 
formula from this point of view. 
ii) Unlike Vanek. who expected higher employment from profit-sharing 
but did not mention full employment, Weitzman is certain that the 
introduction of profit-sharing can achieve full employment. This 
requires not only that the physical marginal product of labour should be 
positive at full employment (which is implicit in Vanek's diagrams 
though not in his argument, and which might not be the case after a 
protracted worldwide recession such as that recently experienced) but 
also that a positive physical marginal product of labour should be 
associated with a positive marginal revenue. This condition, made more 
difficult by imperfect competition, is satisfied in Weitzman 1985b by 
assuming isoelastic demand functions of elasticity greater than unity, 
i.e. very different from the conventional imperfect competition_demand 
functions of Chamberlin or Robinson, or by other ad-hoc assumptions such 
as sale of the physical marginal product of labour in an international 
market at a positive f.o.b. price (as Weitzman stipulated at a Conference 
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at Cornell University, April 1986). Moreover, for this positive margin~l 
revenue product of labour to ensure full employment, it has to be lower than 
the minimum fixed pay acceptable to workers. Nowhe-re does Weitzman justify 
his confidence that the necessary conditions might be satisfied; without 
these conditions this is the end of the story and Weitzman's results are 
no different from Vanek's: no miracle cure for st~gflation is available. 
iii) If full employment is reached the long-term equilibrium of a 
profit-sharing economy should be, coeteris paribus, identical to that of 
a wage economy, i.e. the same real averag~ pay .accrues to workers in 
either case, equal to the marginal physical product of labour. Weitzman 
takes for granted that a sharing formula can persist in long-run full 
employment equilibrium and infers, from the presence of a sharing 
element, that the marginal cost of labour (= the fixed component of pay) 
is lower than the marginal product of labour (= the fixed plus the 
sharing components of pay), i.e. there is a permanent state of excess 
demand for labour at full employment, which is not inflationary because 
firms cannot raise average pay above the marginal product of labour. 
Nuti (1985, 1986a) points out that this inequality should induce firms 
to experiment with alternative pay formulas amounting to the same total 
pay, especially if they can gain from workers' risk-aversion, and not to 
rest until they have equalised their marginal cost and marginal value of 
labour, i.e. until the workers' share of net profits is zero and profit-
sharing comes to an end. 
iv) In any case firms should be well aware - especially at full 
employment - that whatever their pay formula they can only attract workers 
by offering the going rate for labour total pay and should regard this, 
and not the fixed element of pay, as marginal cost of labour. If firms 
behave as they should, excess demand for labour disappears and with it 
the claimed resilience of full employment with respect to deflationary 
shocks. 
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v) The lack of workers' participation in decision-making in any area 
affecting employment (therefore in all areas of any importance) is a specific 
precondition of Weitzman's claims. We know that it· is possible to exclude 
workers from eo-determination in the presence of persistent unemployment; 
such exclusion might be difficult at full employment, and it would certainly 
be very difficult with excess demand for labour; but the persistent excess 
demand for labour postulated by Weitzman should make the exclusion of 
eo-determination impossible without an authoritarian or military regime. 
This is not a moral, or legal, or legalistic proposition; it is a question 
of practical politics. Once workers have a say on output, employment and 
pricing and related questions (investment, innovation, etcetera) they will 
try and res~st the very possibility of dilution of their own shares just 
as shareholders usually resist the dilution of share capital; for better 
or worse they are likely to adop_t, or be tempted to adopt,. other things 
being equal, restrictive employment policies in the possibly misguided 
and self-defeating purpose of raising or maintaining indivi~ual earnings. 
This is not a case against profit-sharing, but an argument for not 
expecting that full employment - let alone over-full employment - is 
achievable and maintainable (see Nuti, 1986c). 
If full employment and, a fortiori, over-full employment could be 
guaranteed, profit-sharing would be like a public good to be provided by 
central government through tax incentives and propaganda. Sadly, neither 
full employment nor its stability can be guaranteed by profit-sharing. 
The claims put forward by Weitzman in the long run can only damage -
through skepticism and disillusionment - the chances of reaping from 
profit-sharing the modest but non-negligible gains which appear to be 
available. 
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